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1. Abstract 
The economic policy reforms play an important role to increase the economic growth of the 
countries. The economic policy reforms can perform in both national and sectoral levels. There 
are two main types of economic reforms at national level including stabilisation policies and 
structural adjustments policies. In addition to that, economic policy reforms may happen in any 
sector like agriculture, industry and trade. Due to economic reforms create the distributional 
effects in the society, it creates both losers and winners, in addition to producing of delayed 
outcomes. This distributional effect might create a political volatility in the society. Therefore, 
political authorities are indifferent between the self-interest and uncertainty of their tenure of 
the office in next period. If the country suffers from political instability, the risk of losing the 
power of existing government is high and then, the policy reforms will be delayed. In addition 
to that, the literature highlights the importance of government credibility for the successful 
economic reforms. Some governments support for the redistribution policies, and some are not. 
It is entirely depended on the ideological polarisation. Therefore, for the successful policy 
changes, formulation of politically sound economic policies and timely implementation of 
those policies are essential. 
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2. Survey of Literature  
2.1. Introduction 
The market failure issues such as externalities, the supply of public goods, monopoly behaviour 
and imperfect competition make economy inefficient (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013). As a 
remedy for this inefficiency, the critical economic policy reforms can be implemented at the 
national level (e.g., stabilisation policies and structural adjustments) and sectoral level (eg., 
Agriculture, Industry, Trade) (Adams, 2000; The World Bank, 2008). Economic policy reforms 
may create winners and losers. Some social groups lobby to delay/expedite the policy reforms 
due to heterogeneity of group interests and uncertainty about the benefits for the group (Adams, 
2000). This lead to change the political equilibrium in the society (Acemoglu & Robinson, 
2013).  
2.2.The political economy models of economic policy reforms 
As describes in Pederson (1997) and Adams (2000), in the policy reforms process, 
government/public sector parties (including policy makers and implementers) and private 
groups (workers, capitalist, farmers, students, etc.) expect to increase their payoff. The 
government parties show a rent-seeking behaviour to sell their political power, and private 
groups want to buy the political influence. The private groups pay briberies to the government 
parties to delay/expedite the policy decisions (Pederson, 1997; Adams, 2000). The ruling elite 
get the ultimate decision on implementation of policy reforms, and this decision depends on 
their self-interest and political uncertainty (Adam 2000). The decision makers are uncertain 
about the net benefit of the policy, redistribution of the benefits, movement of production 
factors in the economy after the policy reforms (Adam, 2000). These uncertainties may create 
a political risk, and if the power is in danger, the political elite will not decide to implement the 
reform policies. However, if this process ends with a Nash equilibrium, all groups obtain the 
benefits of policy reforms. Therefore, in the process of policy reforms, it is important to 
consider about the redistribution effects, political regime, economic and political stability in 
the country at the time of reform policy implementation. 
 
2.2.1.Policy reforms and redistribution effect  
Alsina & Rodrik (1994) explains that the demand for policy reforms depends on the distribution 
of productive resources in the society. The higher inequality and the poor property rights 
impede the economic growth (Alisina & Rodrick, 1994; Persson & Tabellini, 1994; Clark, 
1995). On the other hand, the political regime decides the redistribution policies and property 
rights of the citizens. Following sections discuss the redistribution effects of stabilisation 
policies and structural adjustment policies. 
Stabilisation policies target the macroeconomic conditions such as improving the balance of 
payments, inflation controls and currency devaluation (Adms, 2000; Easterly, 2003). Currency 
devaluation causes to a rapid increase in price level (Herbst, 1990). On the other hand, the 
Central Bank Independence (CBI) can reduce the inflation significantly if the government 
expenditure is medium (Acemoglu, Johnson, Querubin & Robinson, 2008). But, less 
government spending may affect negatively on some disadvantaged communities. 
Structural adjustments mainly include the privatisation and promoting the private sector, 
reducing of trade barriers, export promotion, discouraging of import substitution industries, 
removing of price and interest rate control (Adms,2000 ; Easterly, 2003). Both privatisation 
and discouraging of import substitution industries may lead a short-term unemployment 
(Herbst, 1990). According to Easterly (2003), the structural adjustments policies are less 
helpful to poverty reduction because poor who are in informal sector will benefit less from the 
reforms in the formal sector. Therefore, the benefits transferring programmes need to be 
implemented to target the vulnerable groups (Easterly, 2003).  
 
2.2.2. Economic policy reforms in different political regimes 
The successfulness of policy reforms mainly depends on the political regime. The democratic 
political system influences negatively on the economic reforms (Gordon, 1996). Although the 
political liberalisation removes the constraints for economic growth (Gordon, 1996), in the 
democratic system, policy reforms may generate a high political risk for the government, it 
may cause to delay the decisions on policy reforms. Meanwhile, Marangos (2005) claims that 
without some minimum level of political cooperation, successful economic reforms cannot be 
implemented.  
The voting decision affects on redistribution and thereby economic growth in democratic 
systems (Alisina & Rodrik, 1994). High level of democracy causes lower economic growth 
after the policy reforms. If the political regime is relatively longer, it lower the economic 
growth (Jong-A-Ping, De Haan, 2007). In addition to that, the ideological polarisation 
influences on the redistribution policies (Alisina & Tabellini, 1989). In contrast to the 
democratic regime, the authoritarian regime does not affect due to voting decisions of people 
in the policy reforms. 
 
2.2.3. Best time for policy reforms 
If an economy is in a crises, it means the economy is in a Pareto-inferior and existing policies 
are not supported. It is the best time to implement the reform policies (Drazen & Grilli, 1993; 
Rodrik, 1996). The political stability of the country facilitate the collective decision making 
for stakeholders (Cukierman, Edward & Tabellini, 1992). If policy reforms introduce under the 
political instability, sometimes the country might go to more inferior position.  
 
3. Conclusion  
Many countries in the world provides clear examples on the importance of political and 
economic relationship in the economic reforms. Both South Korea and Taiwan highlight the 
importance of foreign aid in economic reforms (Rodrik, Grossman & Norman, 1995).  Both 
these countries implemented policy reforms including currency devaluation, export promotion, 
providing subsidies to specific industries,   high public investments in infrastructure 
developments and human capital developments (Rodrik, Grossman & Norman, 1995; Rodrik, 
1996). As describes by Rodrik (1996), in 1950s, the inequality of these countries was very low 
and consisted of an educated labour force. The governments of these countries did not much 
focus on redistribution policies due to low inequality, and implemented required economic 
reforms. The political leaders closely monitored the behaviour of government bureaucrats, and 
educated group of government officials promote the private entrepreneurs (Rodrik, 1996). The 
success of economic reforms in South Korea, Taiwan and other East Asian Countries 
highlighted the importance of stable political leadership for economic growth. 
Newell (2011) shows the importance of politics in economic growth by taking the examples 
from Mexico. During the period from 1935 to late 1980’s, the economy of Mexico showed a 
higher growth rate. However, the bad government policies including overvaluation of Peso, 
which was implemented in 1970s and early 1980s, increased government expenditure and 
discouraged the private sector. Eventually, the economy drove to the crises during the 1976-
1982 (Nowell, 2011). Acemoglu & Robinson (2013) stress that some good economic policies 
does not sound politically by highlighting the devaluation experience in Ghana. In 1971, Ghana 
government’s decision on currency devaluation to improve the balance of payments and 
foreign exchange condition  ends up with the capturing the power by another political leader. 
As Acemoglu, et al. (2008) describe that multiple policy reforms may create a seesaw effects. 
For instance, if government implement inflation control policies simultaneously with high 
government expenditure, the country will not be able to reduce the inflation. Alisina & Drazen 
(1991) says, although policy increases the efficiency of economy, if it has a significant negative 
impacts on distribution, the implementation of policy is difficult.  
Implementation of economic policies are essential for economic growth and development. Any 
economic policy has a distributional effect and it may create losers and winners and thereby, it 
may change the political equilibrium in the society. Therefore, ruling elites tend to keep their 
tenure in office continuously by avoiding the critical economic policy reforms. As literature 
revealed, if the country is politically stable, the government can take policy reforms because 
the risk for loss the power is very low.  If the country is in a situation like the external debt 
crises, inflation crises, banking crises, economic recession and high inequality, then it is a good 
time for implement economic reform policies (Agnello, Casreo, Jalles &Sousa, 2015). 
Therefore, in conclusion, the good economic reforms need to be politically sound, and it is 
essential to consider the redistribution effect, political regime, economic condition and political 
stability of the country.  
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